Thu
Aug
12

Moldova’s Resilience: the story of a fragile state

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Moldova may be a fragile state today, but it has made a political breakthrough due to the snap elections in 2021 that brought pro-reform political forces to power. This unique breakthrough should be regarded as the largest “window of opportunity” ever available to work on (re-)building a country’s much-needed resilience.

There is a conventional assumption that Moldova is a “failed state”, which does not at all fit the situation on the ground, where the country shows a surprising degree of resilience. It is worth distinguishing between one’s ability to survive and the ability to “bounce back” or “forward”, which is common to the standard, rather academic, definition of resilience. A more practical approach to resilience comes from international development organisations, which view resilience as “the ability to absorb and recover from shocks”, “while transforming” taking into account “long-term stress, change and uncertainty”.[1] Therefore, to understand where Moldova stands, the following analysis looks at the shortcomings that restrict its capacity for resilience, on the one hand, and the factors that have helped it stay afloat and withstand internal shocks, on the other.

Four aspects are the most important to assess the constraints under which a state operates and from which the degree of resistance can be deduced: (1) state authority; (2) enforcement of the rules; (3) control of violence; and (4) the provision of public services. In as far as Moldova is concerned, primo, despite the reliability and predictability deficit, the country still has sufficient internal and external authority to be part of and comply with international agreements. Segundo, the authorities can still set rules, respecting and importing the legislation of the global standard-setter, the EU, although they face challenges in ensuring proper enforcement. Tertio, it is true that Moldova does not represent a battlefield for military confrontations. However, there is a prolonged unresolved post-Soviet territorial conflict, which holds the country back and perpetuates uncertainty for national and regional stability and security. Cuarto, unlike a “failed state”, Moldova has public authorities that do provide services. Obviously, they may not always be of adequate quality, but the population has access to them, accepting their widespread imperfections and likely shortages, largely due to a lack of alternatives.

The Fragile States Index paints an accurate picture of the year-on-year decline in Moldova’s state performance, from the 57th place in 2006, to the 103rd in 2021 (out of 179 countries). Such decline is consequential for the state’s potential to generate and display resilience.

This mixed picture described above does not intend to underestimate the actual steadfast decline that Moldova has experienced throughout its 30 years of existence as an independent state. On the contrary, the nuances that describe the state at different levels of state affairs are indicative of the unevenness of existing resources and capacities. In addition, these have eroded over the last decade and even reached a dangerous point when the governing system fell into “state capture”[2] mode in the period 2015-2019. The Fragile States Index[3] paints an accurate picture of the year-on-year decline in state performance, from the 57th place in 2006, to the 103rd in 2021 (out of 179 countries). Such decline is consequential for the state’s potential to generate and display resilience. There are many problematic areas. The economic stagnation is acute, more recently due to the inefficient tools applied to mitigate the 2020-21 COVID-19 pandemic crisis. The growing public distrust of state institutions, except the church and the military, has put the state in trouble. Amid multiplying adversities, such as droughts, torrential rains, floods, all accelerated by climate change, state institutions do not benefit from the close understanding and cooperation of a skeptical society. As a common characteristic, citizens find themselves in distress at home due to economic hardships or frequent political crises and uncertainty. Alternatively, they plan to emigrate as one of the most common survival strategies among Moldovans of all age categories. The country’s fragile budget balance finds itself under severe strain due to declining demographics, which creates cascading effects that far outweigh the country’s long-term financial stability. In short, without solid human capital, which becomes scarce or underdeveloped due to the lack of financial resources from the state, the capacity to generate resilience, from the national to the individual level, is limited.

Vulnerability everywhere, but some areas need immediate attention

Based on the OECD’s Resilience System Analysis (RSA)[4], which operates with six dimensions of resilience – financial, human, natural, physical, political and social – this analysis aims to emphasise only those that are considered to have the highest destabilising potential in the face of an eventual local or external shock.

To begin with, the endemic corruption constitutes the greatest vulnerability in the political realm, undermining democratic practices, primarily good governance, and affecting the preparedness of state institutions. Therefore, instead of catering exclusively to the public interest, institutions begin to serve private objectives that are often mixed with political loyalty in the distribution of public finances. This problem is widespread among the heads of the local public administration, state agencies and the courts. The Corruption Perception Index[5] has always identified high levels of corruption in Moldova, with the worst ranking in 2016, when it came in at the 123rd place out of 176 countries. Public polls also attest that corruption has been leading the list of the population’s main worries: concern with the extent of corruption has grown from 5-7% in 2010-2012 to 20-25% in 2020-2021, to the point where it is perceived as being as important as economic development and the improvement of living conditions[6].

The endemic corruption constitutes the greatest vulnerability in the political realm, undermining democratic practices, primarily good governance, and affecting the preparedness of state institutions.

Another problematic aspect is the great distrust of the judiciary in Moldova, which may have social implications. More precisely, the inability to enforce the rule of law leads to the loss of strategic state assets and other types of office abuse. This affects citizens’ trust in public authorities and their willingness to be cooperative, as clearly shown by the slow vaccination process during the Covid-19 pandemic. As a result, the state’s responsiveness to a crisis can become fragmented, slow and ineffective. The monumental combination of corruption and lack of professionalism in the judicial system revolves primarily around a few specific themes. The many lost cases in the European Court of Human Rights, due to questionable decisions issued by local judges, have costed the public budget large sums (about 19 million euro in 1998-2020[7]). It is worth remembering here the facilitation of the “Russian laundromat”[8] by a group of at least 13 Moldovan judges[9], who helped divert about $ 18-20 billion from Russia by legalising fictitious debts that enabled transfers from Russian enterprises and banks through Moldovan banks further to offshore companies[10]. Finally, another severe episode of political favouritism and lack of professionalism was represented by the annulment of local elections in the capital city of Chisinau in 2018[11].

Last but not least, in terms of physical resilience, Moldova lacks a reliable power supply due to (in)direct dependence on electricity and gas supplies from the east. Russia’s unpredictability and its weaponisation of energy for political purposes has turned inherited connectivity from the Soviet era into a structural weakness today. The electricity sector depends on supplies from Ukraine, but even more from Moldova’s breakaway region (Transnistria), which being a de facto Russian exclave can turn into a geopolitical card at any time.[12] Under pressure from the Energy Community and EU assistance, national electricity procurement has become more transparent in the last 5 years. However, there is little interest from Ukrainian suppliers, due to the Cuciurgan power station[13] situated in the Transnistrian region, that produces electricity based on Russian gas for which it does not pay. As a result, the Moldovan gas operator “MoldovaGaz”, 50% of the shares of which are owned by Gazprom, continues to accumulate debts to Russia, now amounting to more than $ 7.4 billion[14]. The unresolved gas debt problem debilitates the energy sector as a whole. A similarly complicated situation is observed in the gas sector that is undergoing tectonic changes through the implementation of the EU’s Third Energy Package (since 2009). However, the country is still in the process of separating the producer from the supplier, which may break the Russian monopoly. The gas pipeline connecting Moldova with Romania, expanded in 2014-2020, is a way out towards greater diversity and predictability in terms of geography of supply, especially in the cold season. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the Romania-Moldova gas pipeline is supposed to be operational in 2021, direct contracts with Russia still appear to be more attractive, due to direct price negotiations with Gazprom. Romania’s energy system could provide a valuable boost to energy resilience, after the high voltage line in southern Romania is connected to the centre of Moldova, which is forecasted to happen by 2024.

Russia’s unpredictability and its weaponisation of energy for political purposes has turned inherited connectivity from the Soviet era into a structural weakness today.

Russia’s unpredictability and its weaponisation of energy for political purposes has turned inherited connectivity from the Soviet era into a structural weakness today.

Options for increased resilience

Resolving or at least mitigating the aforementioned vulnerabilities that undermine Moldova’s resilience requires the proper functioning of state institutions, public trust in these institutions, and decision-makers driven by the public interest. One way to improve the preparedness of institutions in the face of a crisis, from the local authorities to the national law enforcement sector, is to counter corruption through zero tolerance policies, capacity-building and the empowerment of the integrity agency, to restore the trustworthiness of the public sector. A reliable general prosecutor and court system are also of the essence. The state’s response capacity requires a solid mechanism of early warning systems and crisis management in the field of hybrid or conventional threats. However, more than that, state authorities need the public to trust them so as to follow official instructions during critical situations, such as a pandemic. For this, the comprehensive cleansing of the judiciary is essential, as it can restore the credibility of protection against abuses committed by corrupt public servants. Furthermore, a reliable judicial system will strengthen state structures, making them more accountable and therefore resistant to all kinds of uncertainty. The physical infrastructure is also of the utmost importance. Therefore, the weaknesses of the energy sector should be resolved sooner rather than later, especially given the geopolitical characteristics of this problem that gives Russia important levers on Moldova’s energy sustainability. Functional interconnections with Romania, as well as Ukraine, may be the best solutions for investing in the country’s energy resilience.

Resolving or at least mitigating some of the core vulnerabilities that undermine Moldova’s resilience requires the proper functioning of state institutions, public trust in these institutions, and decision-makers driven by the public interest.

Moldova may be a fragile state today, but it has made a political breakthrough due to the snap elections in 2021 that brought pro-reform political forces to power. This unique breakthrough should be regarded as the largest “window of opportunity” ever available to work on (re-)building a country’s much-needed resilience. The pandemic and the multiplication of natural disasters in neighbouring regions, caused by climate change, together with new adversities such as cyberattacks, show that resilience will become one of the most valuable assets that a country must have in the coming years.

[1] OECD, Guidelines for Resilience Systems Analysis: How to analyze risk and build a roadmap to resilience, 2014, https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/Resilience%20Systems%20Analysis%20FINAL.pdf

[2] Denis Cenusa, The Downfall of a Captured State, New Eastern Europe, 2019,  https://neweasterneurope.eu/2019/11/13/the-downfall-of-a-captured-state/

[3] The Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index 2021, https://fragilestatesindex.org/

[4] OECD, Guidelines for Resilience Systems Analysis: How to analyse risk and build a roadmap to resilience, 2014, https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/Resilience%20Systems%20Analysis%20FINAL.pdf

[5] Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2016/index/nzl

[6] Institute of Public Policy, Public Opinion Barometer, 2010-2021, http://bop.ipp.md/en

[7] CRJM, The Republic Moldova at the European Court of Human Rights in 2020, https://crjm.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Nota-analitica-CEDO-2021.pdf

[8] The Russian Laundromat, 2014, https://www.occrp.org/en/laundromat/russian-laundromat/

[9] Cotidianul.md, 2020, https://cotidianul.md/2020/10/21/ce-spune-fostul-sef-al-procuraturii-anticoruptie-despre-cei-13-judecatori-din-dosarul-laundromat-ce-scapa-de-invinuiri/

[10] Anticoruptie.md, 2015, https://anticoruptie.md/ro/investigatii/justitie/prin-intermediul-sistemului-judecatoresc-din-r-moldova-au-fost-spalate-18-miliarde-de-dolari-din-2010-incoace-ii

[11] Moldovans Protest Nullification of Chisinau’s Mayoral Election Results, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/moldovans-protest-nullification-chisinau-mayoral-election/29316498.html

[12] Intellinews, 2017, https://www.intellinews.com/moldova-resumes-electricity-imports-from-transnistria-123028/

[13] US International Trade Administration, https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/moldova-energy

[14] IPN, https://www.ipn.md/ro/presedintele-moldovagaz-datoria-fata-de-gazprom-este-una-comerciala-7965_1070511.html

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Sun
Apr
18

The AURo-Atlantic Romania

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The illusion generated by Romania’s pro-European political choice has led to a collective blindness towards the country’s backsliding from European values. Increasingly, one of our core security threats comes from within, rather than outside our borders. 

Romania’s accession to the European Union and NATO was backed by almost unanimous popular support, and throughout the years the country has maintained its position among the states which held the EU and the US in the highest esteem. One generation after another has learned in school that the Latin origins of the Romanian language and people (through which we are related to France, Italy and Spain, countries that many Romanians call home today) are defining for our national identity. Through the royal family we have become related to Europe once again.

The post-1989 strategic choice Romania made was firmly pro-Western, even during the times of Ion Iliescu and Adrian Năstase, when very little of what was happening in our country was reminiscent of the realities in the EU. The Bucharest-London-Washington axis was not derailed even by Brexit, Donald Trump or Liviu Dragnea. Currently, in the EU Parliament, Romania votes consistently along the lines promoted by the Western Franco-German nucleus, and is methodically avoiding any association with the democratic backslidings of other Eastern European states. Everything in our history and identity is European, and the pinnacle of our post-1989 aspirations was always to be sought in the West.

EU membership has brought us the possibility to work and study in the West. In spite of repeated and considerable pressures on the rule of law and democracy, over the past years Romanians have supported the anti-corruption agenda, whether at the ballot or in the streets through protest. Romania’s presence at the head of the fastest-growing EU economies has been constant in recent years, its GDP increasing eightfold since the 1990s. We are among the most reliable European countries regarding the NATO defence expenditure pledges.

The forest of backwardness hidden behind the European trees

In such a context, how could one ever suspect that we are anything but the quintessential expression of Euro-enthusiasm? We have fed ourselves with the illusion that the only possible direction was ‘further and further to the West’; that modernisation and Europeanisation are inevitable processes; that we are invulnerable to the problems faced by our neighbours – from the rise of the far-right and the intolerance towards migrants and minorities of any kind, to the slide into authoritarianism, the spread of Russian propaganda and attempts at destabilisation, simply because ‘we are so pro-West and anti-Russian’.

There is another reality represented by a version of Romania that looks more and more different from what Europe really represents structurally and in terms of values and identity.

Notwithstanding these realities which some of us share, there is another reality represented by a version of Romania that looks more and more different from what Europe really represents structurally and in terms of values and identity. The political class is using the pro-European discourse opportunistically, rather than with the purpose of genuinely promoting a set of values to Romanian society. The policies adopted in the past decades have effectively marginalised the people that do not live in large urban centres, and thus see themselves trapped in a context that does not offer them many of the opportunities that promised to be so abundant at the time of the country’s accession to the European Union: a country with families split between those that have left to a seek better income in the West and those that have stayed and have been supported by them, a country in which some of us have prospered because of the new economic trends, whilst others have felt overwhelmed by changes that we did not understand and that nobody prepared us for.

The success of AUR, inconceivable until recently, as well as all the instances of ultraconservative and antidemocratic actions are primarily a consequence of this trend.

The traditional parties have fostered a radical electorate behind their democratic rhetoric

Until the moment the exit poll in December’s parliamentary elections was announced, the Romanian media’s interest in the AUR party was close to zero. The shock generated by the collective realisation that a party unknown to most people was to become the fourth-largest political force in the country generated an avalanche of articles that either presented the profile of the AUR candidates and their most outrageous declarations, or commented in an alarmist tone on the consequences of Romania’s entry in the ranks of the European states with extremist representation in their parliaments. However, all these approaches are distant from the essence of the problem.

The Romanian electorate with sympathies towards populist or nationalist narratives is not new. Although the 9% score obtained by AUR may seem very high, in the parliamentary elections with the lowest turnout since the Romanian Revolution this translated into little more than around 540,000 votes. This number seems less impressive if compared with the one million votes received by PPDD in the 2012 elections, when this (now-defunct) party capitalised upon the ongoing hardships associated by the economic crisis through its staunchly populist discourse.

AUR has achieved prominence because it gives a voice to a part of the population, and promises to fill the void that they feel.

The duplicitous rhetoric used by Romania’s main political parties is one of the reasons why this segment of the population has remained largely under the radar in the past years. Hence the Social Democratic Party (PSD), along with smaller parties such as PRO Romania or ALDE, and even the National Liberal Party (PNL), have adopted a nominally democratic pro-European rhetoric meant to gain the sympathy, or at least the trust, of Romania’s international partners. At the same time, these same groups have not shied away from adopting socially conservative and even antidemocratic positions when this promised some easily obtained electoral points. In fact, such electorates were actively cultivated.

Apart from social values, the main parties have also pushed for policies that led in the end to an uneven, imbalanced development. After three decades when PSD, nominally a social-democratic party, has regularly governed Romania, our country is still at the very bottom of the risk of poverty rankings in the EU: according to Eurostat, in 2018, 23.5% of Romanians were in a difficult or very difficult financial situation. At the same time, although the PNL defines its vision as promoting a ‘respect for diversity’, among others, this party voted almost unanimously in favour of the illiberal 2018 referendum aimed at banning same-sex marriages in Romania. It is also fairly clear that repeated declarations with nationalist and anti-Hungarian undertones by some PNL leaders did not do much in helping promote the party as a defender of liberalism in our society.

Although it may seem that the rise of AUR comes from its clear, simple and ideologised discourse, this dimension comes only second among the factors that have contributed to its success. Although undeniably persuasive and well-adapted to the dynamics of social media, the discourse of AUR only represents a vehicle being used with great effectiveness. First and foremost, AUR has achieved prominence because it gives a voice to a part of the population, and promises to fill the void that they feel. This void is the key, and not the fact that an agile and opportunistic actor has observed a vulnerability and has learned to exploit it. The current excessive focus on AUR, as if it represents a sole and exhaustive expression of political radicalisation in Romania, is moving the spotlight away from the true issue: the practices of the main parties and the failure of their development policies.

Romania has the largest disparities between the regions with the highest and lowest GDP per capita in the entire European Union (the most developed region in our country is 3.6 times more prosperous than the least developed one).

AUR remains the least of our worries

What we are seeing is fundamentally a problem of social exclusion and absence of opportunities. The chronic distrust in the state authorities and moderate political forces, or even the quintessential institutions of representative democracy, stems from their sustained incapacity to generate prosperity. Although not alone in facing this issue, Romania has been performing exceptionally poorly in this chapter, year after year. In September 2020, essential democratic institutions received abysmal trust ratings: only 9.5% of Romanians trusted the country’s parliament, while 13.7% had confidence in the country’s government. 

If there were truly a climate of public trust in the country’s institutions, the conspirational and anti-system discourse of AUR could not have resonated in such a way. Their nationalist and illiberal rhetoric lacks rigour if it is not assembled upon a frame of distrust and alienation amongst segments of the society. Unfortunately, the unequal socio-economic evolution of our country has led precisely to this reality. 

Between 2014 and 2019, Romania prided itself in one of the biggest GDP increases in the EU, over 40%. In recent years, some areas of the country have experienced a remarkable growth, with standards of living coming to a par with those in Western Europe. According to Eurostat, in 2019 the Bucharest-Ilfov area had a GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity) larger than that of cities such as Helsinki or Berlin. The contrasts within the country, however, are enormous. Romania has the largest disparities between the regions with the highest and lowest GDP per capita in the entire European Union (the most developed region in our country is 3.6 times more prosperous than the least developed one). All other regions of our country feature on the lower third of the EU’s development ranking.

Romania has a major social mobility issue as well. According to the 2020 Global social mobility index from the World Economic Forum, Romania is the second most difficult place in the EU to improve your social and financial situation if you are from a low-income background. Only Greece, a country devastated by an economic crisis spanning almost 10 years, fares worse among EU states at this indicator.

Marginalisation – a national security risk

An analysis conducted in 2016 by the Romanian National Institute of Statistics revealed that the counties with the largest percentage of former residents that have emigrated over the shortage of jobs were in the province of Moldova. In Neamț, the number of emigrants almost equals the number of existing workplaces in the county. There is no coincidence that such regions lacking any opportunities have the constituencies where AUR obtained its best results. For as long as the socio-economic developments leave behind winners and losers separated by such a large gap, the conditions favouring the success of nationalist parties will linger on. And as economic and political results are oftentimes attributed to the European Union in the public psyche, the resentment towards a West perceived as not delivering on expectations can be expected to rise (which will also be amplified by parties keen to find a scapegoat for all of the country’s misfortunes). 

Abandoning such a large portion of our population to underdevelopment represents a major vulnerability for our country in the face of rising authoritarianism and illiberalism, and therefore poses a structural risk that malign foreign actors will be very keen to exploit in order to slow down and reverse the country’s modernisation and Europeanisation.

Abandoning such a large portion of our population to underdevelopment represents a major vulnerability for our country in the face of rising authoritarianism and illiberalism, and therefore poses a structural risk that malign foreign actors will be very keen to exploit in order to slow down and reverse the country’s modernisation and Europeanisation. When people see themselves systematically neglected by conventional political actors and the institutions that are meant to serve them, they turn their hopes and support to whichever options promising a change. AUR has communicated effectively; it knew who its target-audience was; it has indeed been helped by the context of heightened uncertainty and distrust amplified by the pandemic, and it has exploited the popularity of the church in the countryside to attract the most visible and vocal part of the dissatisfied. However, many more have remained under the diffuse influence of PSD, PNL and their smaller satellites, where they serve as an exploitable demographic that is much larger than the 500,000 votes which AUR won last time.

The Romanian version of the article was published on Adevărul.

About the projectSupported by the National Endowment for Democracy, Political Capital and its partners from Austria, Bulgaria, Czechia, Poland, Slovakia and Romania are researching value-based attitudes to foreign policy and authoritarian influence in the European Union’s institutions.

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Thu
Nov
26

Moldova: the first ‘pas’ forward

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The acronym for the group led by Maia Sandu – PAS – has a symbolic meaning in the context of the latest elections. This word means ‘step’ in Romanian, and indeed Sandu’s victory, although it was ground-breaking for all the reasons mentioned below, is only the first step on the way towards possible serious changes to the political and social situation in Moldova. On 15 November, Maia Sandu, the former prime minister of Moldova and the leader of the pro-Western Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), won the second round of the presidential elections in Moldova with 57.75%. At the same time her rival Igor Dodon, the outgoing president and the informal leader of the pro-Russian Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM) won 42.25% of the vote. 

New elites and kingmakers from abroad

November’s elections were ground-breaking in many respects. Never before in the short history of the independent existence of the Republic of Moldova have its citizens chosen for their president a person who did not belong to the former Soviet nomenclature or was not associated with shady local political and business groups. Dodon, for example, is perceived by many as a corrupt representative of the oligarchic elites and the defender of the ‘old order’, in which the state serves primarily as an instrument for the enrichment of a specific group of people. On the other hand, the first three presidents of the republic between 1990 to 2009 had previously held high positions in the Communist Party of Moldova, the local branch of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 

Also for the first time, the Moldovan people, who are quite conservative and have a traditional view of social roles, decided to entrust not simply a woman, but an unmarried and childless one, with the position of head of state. The gender issue, and especially Sandu’s matrimonial status, has been exploited many times in recent years by her political opponents. The absence of spouse or children allowed her political opponents to spread groundless rumours about her sexual orientation. 

Never before in the short history of the independent existence of the Republic of Moldova have its citizens chosen for their president a person who did not belong to the former Soviet nomenclature or was not associated with shady local political and business groups.

Another novelty is the role played by the diaspora. Moldovan emigrants, estimated at up to one million in number, have always shown interest in the elections held in their homeland, but the scale of their participation has never been as massive as it was in November 2020. In the second round of elections, over 260,000 votes were cast in polling stations abroad. This is twice as much as in the first round, and four times more than in the first round of the 2016 elections. Foreign votes accounted for up to 15 percent of all ballots cast. A quarter of the vote for Maia Sandu came from abroad. There is no doubt that one of the important factors that led to such a large mobilisation of the diaspora in the second round was the critical, if not mocking, comment made by President Igor Dodon after the results from the first round were released; he called the Moldovan emigrants a “parallel electorate”, and suggested that they do not fully understand the situation in the country. It is worth noting that this large-scale mobilisation for Sandu almost exclusively applied to Moldovan emigrants living in the West, i.e. the EU, Great Britain and the USA. These countries accounted for over 90% of all the votes cast outside the republic. 

Meanwhile, the Moldovan émigrés in Russia – although estimated at up to half a million – remained very passive. In the second round of elections, fewer than 14,000 of this group went to the polls; their votes accounted for only 5% of all those cast by the diaspora. Moreover, the myth that Moldovans living in Moscow or St. Petersburg are inclined to almost unanimously support pro-Russian candidates was also broken. Although Igor Dodon won in Russia with a total of 75% of the votes, the 25% Sandu won there should be considered a huge success and proof that the views of the local electorate are evolving.

The fragmentation of the left and corruption fatigue

The final result of the elections was an obvious surprise for Dodon. Even though the incumbent president had realised he could lose the race, he did not expect his rival to obtain such a crushing advantage over him. One of the key reasons for the outgoing president’s failure is the widespread accusations of corruption levelled against him. The de facto leader of the PSRM is seen by many as an associate and informal political ally of Vlad Plahotniuc, an ex-oligarch who lost power in June 2019 and fled the country. Plahotniuc is suspected to have been involved in numerous frauds (including the embezzlement of US$1 billion from the Moldovan banking sector in 2014), and he is the virtual embodiment of corruption in the eyes of the Moldovan public. Sandu took advantage of Dodon’s negative image and focused her campaign not on the usual geopolitical issues that divide the nation (the choice between East or West), but on the corruption fatigue that unites people beyond their political differences. 

Romania should therefore focus its political support for Sandu and consider increasing financial assistance to Moldova. It is also important that Bucharest becomes more actively involved in Moldova’s fight against the pandemic.

This was one key to her success, but there were other issues that undermined Dodon’s position. One of the most important was the return of Renato Usatîi, the populist, pro-Russian leader of ‘Our Party’, onto the Moldovan political scene. Six years ago, this politician was the socialists’ main rival on the Moldovan left. In 2014, just a few days before voting, a court (presumably influenced by Plahotniuc) banned Usatîi’s party from participating in the parliamentary elections, which enabled the socialists to achieve a spectacular success. Soon after, Usatîi left Moldova and moved to Russia. He only came back to his homeland in the second half of 2019, after Plahotniuc had fled the country. His return initiated the fragmentation of the Moldovan political left. The leader of ‘Our Party’, who has been highly critical of Dodon’s presidency, managed to rebuild his support in just over a year and win up to 17% of the votes in the first round of the presidential elections. This allowed Sandu to enter the second round in first place, which demobilised the socialist voters. Moreover, Usatîi asked his electorate to vote ‘against Dodon’ in the runoff elections. As a result, many of his supporters decided not to vote in the second round, or to cast their vote for Sandu, which – in both cases – contributed to victory for the leader of PAS.

What can a president do?

The limited prerogatives that the Moldovan constitution gives to the president will not allow Sandu to implement real structural reforms. However, this does not mean that her victory has no political significance. From her new post Sandu will be able to observe more closely what is happening behind the scenes and monitor the government’s actions. She will also gain access to materials prepared by the intelligence services. The office of the presidency will also provide her with greater recognition and access to the media. This in turn will boost the image of the opposition. She will also be able to influence the country’s foreign policy, which would be particularly important, as in the months to come Sandu will surely focus on diplomatic activities and try to improve Moldova’s relations with its Western partners from the EU, as well as its immediate neighbours Romania and Ukraine. 

There is no doubt that Usatîi’s return to the Moldovan political scene will have negative consequences for the situation in Moldova in the long run.

Apart from corruption, Sandu laid the emphasis in her campaign on social issues and improving the citizens’ standard of living. Romania should therefore focus its political support for Sandu and consider increasing financial assistance to Moldova. It is also important that Bucharest becomes more actively involved in Moldova’s fight against the pandemic. Not only will this have a positive effect on the image of Sandu and the opposition (as the electorate will see it as a direct benefit of her victory), but it will also improve the perception of Romania in Moldova, which was damaged by the fact that in recent years Bucharest unofficially but clearly supported Plahotniuc. There is also no doubt that support from the EU (which will help improve the quality of life of the country’s inhabitants) will be of great importance in building confidence in the pro-Western opposition. Relations with Russia are likely to deteriorate, despite the new president’s desire to pursue a balanced foreign policy. Sandu will find it hard to avoid difficult topics such as the issue of Russian troops in Transnistria or the status of this region, as shown also by her recent media statements, which have elicited negative reactions from Moscow.

On the home front

PAS, strengthened by Sandu’s victory, will call for parliamentary elections to be held as soon as possible. To start real reforms and deliver on Sandu’s election promises, the pro-European opposition needs not only the president, but also a parliamentary majority. This will not be an easy task, although the situation in the Moldovan parliament seems to be favourable. The Chicu government does not currently have a majority in the chamber. After Dodon’s dramatic failure, his party is no longer interested in early parliamentary elections, although the incumbent president had supported them just a few months ago. The socialists are not only afraid of the pro-Western electorate motivated by Sandu’s victory; more importantly, they realise that in the next elections they will undoubtedly face ‘Our Party’, which – judging by Usatîi’s result – may take away a lot of votes from PSRM. It is therefore clear that in this situation the socialists will attempt to rebuild their majority and maintain the current composition of parliament, at all costs and for as long as possible. Even though this will be difficult, there has been speculation about alleged agreements between the socialists and representatives of the Şor Party, together with a group of deputies affiliated to Plahotniuc. The true position of the ‘DA’ Platform Party led by Andrei Năstase is also uncertain. This grouping, although nominally pro-Western, has found itself increasingly at odds with PAS. Moreover, given the low support for ‘DA’, early elections could pose a threat to this party’s presence in the parliament. All these factors may foster the establishment of cooperation between ‘DA’ and the Socialists. There is no doubt that Usatîi’s return to the Moldovan political scene will have negative consequences for the situation in Moldova in the long run. This controversial politician, who has strong but very obscure ties to Russia, will probably try to position himself as Sandu’s ally in the fight against corruption and the oligarchy, although in geopolitical terms he is an opponent of PAS. As a result, his actions may compromise the opposition’s pro-reformist efforts. Establishing any cooperation with him or his associates should therefore be undertaken very carefully, if at all. Otherwise, PAS risks a repeat of the scenario from the end of the second half of 2019, when it was pushed out of power after just five months due to an agreement between the Socialists and the Democratic Party, which was previously led and sponsored by Plahotniuc.

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