By Marius Ghincea | Florence
The European Union prides itself on ‘making war
unthinkable’ among its member states, and credits the European integration
process for the great achievement of Pax Europaea, the longest period of peace
in much of Europe since the collapse of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth
century. Making war unthinkable and materially impossible was the main original
purpose of the European project, and represents one of the main pillars of the
narrative of European identity that legitimises the European Union, at the same
time providing it with significant global normative power (Schuman 1950; Diez
and Manners 2007). But if Pax Europaea has been such a stupendous success, then
why are the Europeans feeling so insecure, fearful and anxious about so many
Successive surveys have shown that Europeans do not feel
secure in an otherwise peaceful Europe, with fears and anxieties running higher
in the last decade than at any other point in time since the end of the Cold
War (Eurobarometer 89 2018; Borger et al. 2015). The regular Eurobarometer
published by the European Commission and other surveys show increased levels of
insecurity and anxiety linked with factors unrelated to the more ‘traditional’
aspects of security, such as socio-economic well-being, personal safety and
terrorism, climate change, and immigration and national identity, especially in
Central and Eastern Europe (Eurobarometer 88, 89; Dennison et al. 2018; Hunyadi
2016). These findings confirm that while military-related insecurity has
diminished since the end of the Cold War, other types of insecurities have
become more prominent and emerged to replace the ‘traditional’ fears that
dominated Cold War-era Europe.
In the last decade, the European Union has faced
significant, even unprecedented, overlapping challenges for which in the eyes
of many Europeans it has frequently failed to provide adequate solutions. And
even when it did so, the emergence and overlapping character of these
challenges created social and political reactions that still have the potential
to undermine the European project (Kinnvall, Manners, Mitzen 2018).
These overlapping challenges undermine not only the
credibility of the European Union as an effective actor, at home and on the
global stage, but also show the fluid and artificial character of
external/internal divisions. External challenges like the refugee flows from
the war-torn Middle East, the lingering conflict in Ukraine and the resurgence
of a bellicose Russia converge with domestic crises caused by a decade of
economic stagnation in much of Europe, the emergence of nativist populism
across Europe, and the unpredictable Brexit process.
These external and internal challenges are serious and pose
various levels of risk to the security of the European Union. The legitimacy
and normative power of the EU on the world stage and at home depend on
successfully providing not only effective solutions, but also a sense of
The existential threat to Europe is not necessarily the sum
of the challenges and crises pressuring it, which in themselves are manageable.
The future of the European Union hinges on its ability to manage the culture of
insecurity that dominates the European public spaces, which is effectively
taking hold of the public agenda.
The challenges and crises that Europe faces are real, but the way the European societies relate to them, through the lens of a dominant culture of insecurity, makes Europe incapable of acting effectively.
This culture of insecurity produces political paralysis,
creates societal instability and narrows the policy options available to
decision-makers, while at the same time decoupling them from the set of values
and principles that define the European identity and its political tradition.
The challenges and crises that Europe faces are real, but
the way the European societies relate to them, through the lens of a dominant
culture of insecurity, makes Europe incapable of acting effectively,
undermining its political institutions and its fundamental values. It forces
European nations to look inward instead of outward, narrowing their focus to
providing immediate relief to these deep-seated and culturally produced
anxieties and fears.
Moreover, this insecurity is being encouraged by foreign
rivals through information warfare, and instrumentalised by far-right and
far-left domestic parties against the political mainstream, fuelling
radicalism, heightening political alienation, and halting progress on important
In order to overcome the various challenges facing Europe,
the European Union and its member states must tackle the ideational and
material sides of this systemic crisis simultaneously. The problem posed by the
culture of insecurity that dominates European public life will not disappear
even if all the external and internal challenges are resolved.
The dramatic decrease in the number of refugees arriving on
Europe’s shores, basically ending the refugee crisis, has not decreased
immigration and identitarian anxieties, as the most recent surveys show. While
this culture of insecurity provides some opportunities for enhanced cohesion
and solidarity, at least on some issues, it primarily creates political
paralysis and undermines European and national political institutions.
Therefore, it is essential that the European institutions
and national governments manage this culture of insecurity systematically and
through a decentralised but coordinated pan-European strategy aimed at
decreasing the sense of insecurity and increasing the sense of hope and trust
in political institutions.
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, I focus on the production of insecurity in Europe, drawing attention to how insecurities emerge, become naturalised and are taken for granted, forgetting that these are essentially social artefacts that are culturally produced by our societies (Weldes et al. 1999, 9). The way we conceive the world and the events affecting us are shaped by these ‘taken for granted’ insecurities that permeate our culture and public discourse. Cultures of (in)securities define the way the general public and the elites perceive and respond to challenges and crises, empowering certain actors and policy options while marginalising others.
Second, I suggest several approaches that may provide effective and relatively efficient alternatives to the culture of insecurity that dominates the European public spheres. The most significant approach consists in mixing narratives with policy actions targeting the symbolic references of Europe’s insecurities. These include the promotion of counter-narratives that deploy rejuvenated liberal myths, and of the memory of the past, both as positive and as negative, in conjunction with proactive policy measures to reduce the immediate day-to-day worries about the future.
What is a ‘culture of insecurity’?
‘Culture’ has long been a fundamentally contested concept
(Gallie 1956; Cobley 2008) which often awakens passionate debates over its
meaning, characteristics, and even its purposefulness. Even so, culture
permeates much of the existing scholarship in the social sciences, especially
in political science and anthropology.
Moreover, our societies rely on ‘culture’ as an important
symbolic tool to justify and describe collective and individual behaviour,
historical processes, and even societal and institutional frameworks. Culture
represents a system of intersubjective meanings, reinforced by practices and
institutions, that human collectivities use to weigh and interpret physical and
These systems function through meaningful symbols produced,
reproduced, and disseminated through discourses, practices, and institutions.
In turn, these dictate social acceptability, behaviour, desire, thoughts, and
feelings. Culture, as an ideational structure shared by a human collectivity,
provides a coherent, consistent, and continuous way of looking at the world,
offering the necessary tools for effective and, sometimes, efficient
Culture liberates and
constrains, creating the tools for comprehending the world but at the same time
setting the limits of this comprehension. Moreover, culture plays a determinate
role in defining identity, providing ontological security and oftentimes a
sense of purpose. The culture(s) of our societies can make us feel secure and
strong or insecure and weak, irrespective of the facts on the ground and our
actual strength. The events in the physical and social world become meaningful
through our social interpretation of them, and this interpretation subsequently
defines our response (Berger and Luckmann 1966).
is neither pre-given nor universal in nature; it emerges from the constant
competition between social narratives and performative practices that dominate
the public sphere. This competition produces winners and losers, and the
winning interpretative narrative and practices become habitualized and
naturalized through mutual acceptance. Therefore, it is important to note that
our own insecurities are not the direct product of the challenges we face, but
are the result of the dominant interpretation of these challenges, which can be
explicit or implicit.
On the production of insecurity
When it comes to the production of insecurity, we can
distinguish between two main ways of creating a sense of insecurity in humans:
linguistic and practice-based approaches. These two approaches can be performed
separately or together, converging or diverging depending on the specific
social and political context. Insecurity is not produced only in reaction to
exogenous or endogenous social and physical events, but it may also produce
these events in a circular process of co-constitution. Even more, these
processes are the ones establishing the border between what is conceived as
security and insecurity (Bigo and McCluskey 2018, 2-3).
First, the linguistic production of insecurity is realized
through so-called processes of securitization. Securitization is a discursive
process that transforms nonpolitical or political matters into ‘security’
issues that require extraordinary measures. It represents an extreme form of
politicization that justifies extraordinary policies and institutional measures
in order to eliminate or alleviate the perceived threat (Buzan et al. 1998, 25).
Such securitisation attempts are undertaken by securitising
actors that have the political capital and legitimacy to attract and maintain
the attention of a target audience, be it a small elite group in a national
government or the general public, which the actor seeks to convince in order to
allow for the use of exceptional measures or the reallocation of resources.
The collective securitization of Muslims in the European
Union is such an example. Entire religious and ethnic communities have been
reframed from benign to collective well-being and security into potentially
existential threats (Kaunert and Léonard 2019; Hansen 2011) to European
societies in various sectors of life, including public safety, culture and
identity, or economic welfare.
Similarly, as Szalai (2017) shows, the refugee crisis that
affected Europe starting in 2015 is another well-known case of securitization,
which in his words has been a source of ‘enacted melodrama’ performed by the
European governments, especially that of Hungary, as a political spectacle that
reframed what seemed like a humanitarian crisis into a threatening ‘invasion’
of Europe by non-European, non-Christian immigrants (Szalai 2017; Postelnicescu
While the linguistic production of insecurity is more
typical of those who have political capital, such as politicians and government
professionals, it is also possible to engage in securitization from outside the
government. Journalists, non-profit actors, and foreign actors are among those
with enough resources and access to the public sphere to reframe certain
challenges as existential threats to a certain referent object.
Second, the practice-based production of insecurity results
through institutional, individual, or collective practices, habitualized
procedures, or technologies employed against a target: sometimes with the
intention of creating chaos and uncertainty, and at other times to create a
perception of security of control. The practices and technologies that seek to
produce security can have the side-effect of producing insecurity and
co-constituting the security/ insecurity nexus (Pfaff 2010; Bigo 2002, 2014;
In the military field, states are crippled by uncertainties
derived from asymmetric information and strategic opacity, always seeking to
become relatively invulnerable but always discovering that the pursuit of
increased security always causes increased insecurity. This (in)security
paradox more often than not produces security dilemmas that spiral into threat
and finally war, if states fail to properly signal benign intentions.
Similarly, in non-traditional security settings, the pursuit of security often
is the catalyst that produces insecurity.
As Didier Bigo shows in his expansive scholarship, European
governments’ pursuit of securing Europe’s borders has constituted the threats
that these borders are created to protect against. Domestically, the economic
and other societal policies and practices that are intended to increase the
general welfare are creating the social and identitarian dichotomies that
create social conflict and produce deep-seated perceptions of insecurity.
Non-state actors can also produce practice-based
insecurities, especially terrorist organizations and radical domestic political
movements. Terrorist attacks are practice-based insecurity-inducers that seek
to produce fear and uncertainty.
Most terrorist attacks have small material and human
consequences, but they produce gigantic insecurities among the target
population. This is why some scholars, like Alex Schmid (2006), define
terrorism as psychological warfare.
But this is only one side of the coin, because governments
that devise counter-terrorist policies and programs also produce insecurity in
order to build political support and cohesion around the desired course of
action against terrorist organizations (Ahmed 2015). Therefore, it can be said
that both state actors and non-state actors produce insecurities for political,
strategic, or as a side-effect of other actions or narratives.
When this sense of insecurity becomes systematic, when it is
felt by significant segments of society, reframing the public space and
changing the social priorities of a collectivity, we can say that a ‘culture of
insecurity’ has emerged. The sense of insecurity drives action but can also
produce paralysis, which usually requires radical upheavals of the status quo
to overcome. It is therefore essential that status quo forces understand the
risks – and opportunities – posed by dominant cultures of insecurity.
Producers of insecurity in Europe
The production of insecurity always presupposes the
existence of at least two actors’ part in what we may very well call a
dialectical transaction. In this transaction, one party tries to inflict upon
the other – with or without the acquiescence of the other – fear, anxieties,
and a general state of insecurity regarding something the other values.
Generally, an implicit or explicit recognition of a source
of insecurity is needed for such a transaction to even be considered by the
actors involved. The recipient of the insecurity needs to acquiesce to the
dangers posed by the source of insecurity and to develop the emotions, set of
beliefs, and behaviour associated with the sense of insecurity. The refusal or
even contestation of the insecurity produced may result in the producer failing
to achieve the desired outcomes, and may even result in the emergence of
counter-interpretations of events and situations.
The production of insecurity can take place through
linguistic approaches, which involves convincing an audience about the
existential threat posed by something or someone; or through practice-based
approaches, like a terrorist attack or the imposition of security-enhancing
technologies that themselves constitute the insecurity they seek to prevent.
Both approaches make use of pre-existing myths,
interpretations of social reality, and historical & political paradigms
that dominate the public space. Nationalism, personal freedom, identity
narratives about minorities and non-Europeans provide a framework in which the
production of new or resurrected insecurities takes place, and in which these
insecurities subsequently compete for attention and dominance of the public
In this section, I will discuss the most common producers of
insecurity in Europe, in their linguistic and practice-based forms.
Revisionist political groups: producing narratives of insecurity
Far-right and far-left political groups have long traditions
of producing anxiety and fear as tools for electoral success. Most European
populist parties, both on the right and the left, instrumentalize insecurity as
a driver for political success.
When these marginal political groups acquire political
power, they transform the production of insecurity into state policy and
publicly construct financed campaigns of vilification that seek to reproduce
the sense of insecurity, purposefully promoting a culture of insecurity that
allows them to remain in power and, even more, to adopt extraordinary measures
that undermine checks-and-balances on their own political power.
These vilification campaigns, which are instrumental in
promoting a culture of insecurity and which allow revisionist groups to alter
the political system to their desires, are building on pre-existing
exclusionary conceptions of nationhood.
These ‘us vs. them’ nationalist conceptions are deep-seated
and inherent characteristics of national identities, especially in ethnically
based forms of nationalism (Smith 1998, 55-56). Revisionist groups make use of
century-old identity cleavages and historical myths in order to legitimise and
promote their narratives of insecurity, and are effective because they are
based on living traditions that are taken for granted.
The vilification and securitization campaigns, both
linguistic and practice-based, of Fidesz in Hungary are such an example.
Similarly, populist parties across Europe, from the economic insecurity
narratives promoted by Alternative for Germany against Germany’s membership of
the Eurozone to the anti-immigration propaganda promoted by Mateo Salvini’s
Lega Nord, are excellent examples of how marginal political groups produce and
use insecurity as electoral tools.
Russia: Enhancing and spreading insecurity
Another source of insecurity in Europe resides in the
subversive actions of third-state or state-supported actors. These states,
notably Russia, use disinformation, hybrid and information warfare to enhance
and spread insecurity (Thomas 2016; Stebbins 2018).
By doing so, they seek to undermine the political status quo
and cause chaos in European societies, forcing them to be more inward-looking.
The methods used by Russian-backed information warfare rarely produce new
insecurities, and usually focus on enhancing already-existing narratives which
produce insecurity, spreading them further and targeting vulnerable demographic
segments (Rummer 2017; Morgan 2018; Spaulding et al. 2018).
The press as a producer of insecurity
While not usually perceived as a producer of insecurity,
mass media represents one of the main producers of insecurity in Europe.
Intentionally or not, mass media across the continent produces, disseminates,
and enhances the insecurities they seek to explain (Lamour 2018). In this way,
the press metamorphosizes from being a simple conduit of knowledge and
information into the producer of that knowledge and information, framing facts
to induce desired reactions and political outcomes. Emotion sells papers and
increases TV audience ratings, creating perverse incentives for news outlets to
enhance and promote strong emotional responses, and therefore to frame social
events, facts, and even ordinary news in ways that provoke insecurity.
Moreover, the acquisition of media outlets by media moguls,
like the Murdoch family in the United Kingdom, transforms these media outlets
into tools of securitization for political or ideological purposes. Framing
challenges and crises as potentially existential threats allows media outlets
to remain relevant in an increasingly decentralized environment, with plenty of
information, at the cost of destroying the fiber of society and undermining
democratic politics and its liberal tradition.
Security professionals: maintaining purpose by manufacturing insecurity
Finally, a very important social group that produces
insecurity is made up of security agencies and security professionals.
Governmental security agencies, as bureaucratic organizations, need a reason to
exist and to justify their public budget. In order to maintain and increase
these budgets, security agencies need to convince legislators and
decision-makers that their existence is justified by the emergence or existence
of security threats, risks and vulnerabilities which need to be contained,
eradicated, or alleviated (Huysmans 2002; Ghincea 2006).
In pursuing these justifications, security agencies seek and
define the threats they need to combat, directly or indirectly producing
insecurities in society by reframing social and political events. This does not
mean that objective.
security challenges do not exist, but the way we relate to
them and the way we respond to them is the result of the social interpretation
provided by security technocrats and professionals that have an invested
interest in justifying their own work and in increasing the budgets available
to them (Huysmans 2002). Therefore security professionals, in the pursuit of
their own purposefulness, can produce insecurities that reinforce and justify
their own work in the eyes of decision makers and the society they seek to
How to overcome the culture of insecurity?
The sense of insecurity that dominates the European public
sphere risks undermining the entire European project and dismantling over half
a century of progress towards integration. No single, pan-European strategy can
be employed in all the member states of the EU, but national strategies can
converge at the European level on the most essential aspects that need to be
covered, and pan-European coordination should be an endeavour undertaken by EU
supranational institutions such as the Commission and the Council.
As stated earlier in this article, an optimal approach to
overcoming the culture of insecurity in Europe requires mixing
counter-narratives and proactive policy actions that could undermine the existing
culture of insecurity and promote a culture of security and hope among the most
seriously affected segments of European societies. In this section, I suggest
potential approaches that can be used to overcome the culture of insecurity and
promote a culture of security that is based on liberal values, political and
Counternarrative: promoting the liberal worldview
The European Union and a majority of its member states are
engaged in campaigns to combat disinformation and manipulation online. These
seem to have been fairly effective in combating ‘fake news’, especially with
regard to media literacy, but in my view these efforts have so far been
ineffective at undermining the culture of insecurity (see also Levinger 2018,
The disinformation and manipulation campaigns promoted by
foreign actors tend to enhance and disseminate an already existing sense of
insecurity that has been promoted through other means by domestic actors, especially
radical political movements, certain media outlets, and even governmental
agencies, as I have argued in the previous section.
Therefore, these campaigns against disinformation must be
undertaken together with positive campaigns promoting counternarratives that
reinforce liberal democracy formed universe formed of mythology, liberal values
and principles, and build trust in democratic political institutions. It is not
enough to simply signal the falsehoods promoted by revisionist actors, because
those that believe such falsehoods are already alienated from the mainstream of
society and have no reason to believe such signals.
What is required is a reinforcement of the liberal universe
as the single most desirable and achievable option (Tuck and Silverman 2016).
Moreover, it is essential for liberal counternarratives to blend offline and
online realities, assuring an overlapping between the online experience and
real-world feelings and social engagement (Meleagrou-Hitchens 2017).
Learning from rivals
Another important step in the process of overcoming the
culture of insecurity is to learn how insecurity is produced and reproduced by
those actors that engage in such endeavours. The best sources of learning about
how to overcome a culture of insecurity are the very same actors that create
By studying and investigating their methods, approaches, and
processes of production, dissemination, and improvement, liberal actors can
find ways not only of undermining them, but to use the same methods for the
production and promotion of counter-narratives that seek to provide an
alternative worldview to that promoted by those who maintain a culture of
Practices & policies: words into deeds
An essential component of any strategy that seeks to
undermine the culture of insecurity consists in combining security-enhancing
linguistic approaches with practice-based approaches. It is not enough to say
that we are secure, that everything will be well, and that the future is
bright; these words need to be transformed and associated with deeds.
Policies and programs intended to alleviate economic
anxieties, reduce segregation, enhance intercultural communication, and promote
an inclusionary national identity should be undertaken and effectively promoted
by governmental and non-profit organizations.
Words need to be matched by deeds in order to be fully
effective, especially because the alienation of vulnerable social groups has
occurred in relation to the liberal worldview, which has failed to meet
expectations and failed to provide what it promised. Therefore, it is essential
that security-enhancing practices are employed together with positive
Ahmed, S. (2015). ‘The “Emotionalization” of the “War on
Terror”: Counter-terrorism, fear, risk, insecurity and helplessness’.
Criminology and Criminal Justice, 15 (5), 545-560. Berger, P. L., &
Luckmann, T. (1966).
‘The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the
Sociology of Knowledge’. New York City: Anchor Books. Bigo, D. (2002).
‘Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease’.
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 27 (1), 63-92. Bigo, D. (2014).
‘The (In) Securitization Practices of the Three Universes of
EU Border Control: Military/Navy – Border Guards/Police – Database Analysts’.
Security Dialogue, 45 (3), 209-225. Bigo, D., & McCluskey, E. (2018).
‘What is a PARIS Approach to (In)Securitization? Political
Anthropological Research for International Sociology’. In A. Gheciu, & W.
Wohlforth, The Oxford Handbook of International Security (pp. 116-133).
Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Borger, J.,
Kirchner, T., Petit, T., Leszczynski, A., Paci, F., & Carbajosa, A. (2015,
February 4). ‘What are Europeans afraid of most?’, The Guardian
Buzan, B., Waever, O., & Wilde, J. d. (1998). ‘Security:
A New Framework for Analysis’.
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishing. Cobley, P. (2008).
‘Culture: Definitions and Concepts’ in W. Donsbach, The International
Encyclopedia of Communication. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publications.
Dennison, S., Franke, U. E., & Zerka, P. (2018). ‘The
Nightmare of the Dark: The Security Fears that Keep Europeans Awake at Night’.
Brussles: European Council on Foreign Relations. European
Commission. (2018). Eurobarometer 89. Brussels: Eurostat. European Commission.
(2019). Eurobarometer 90. Brussles: Eurostat.
Gallie, W. B. (1956). ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56, 167- 198.
Ghincea, M. (2016). ‘The Securitization of Migration in
Europe: A Theoretical Analysis’.
“Power, Pace, Security” Academic Conference, III edition.
Bucharest: The Security Studies Group. Hansen, L. (2011).
‘Theorizing the Image for Security Studies: Visual Securitization
and the Muhammad Cartoon Crisis’. European Journal of International Relations,
17 (1), 51-74.
Hunyadi, B., & Molnár, C. (2016). ‘Central Europe’s
Faceless Strangers: The Rise of Xenophobia’. Budapest: Freedom House. Huysmans,
‘The European Union and the Securitization of Migration’.
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 38 (5), 751-777. Kaunert, C., &
Léonard, S. (2019).
‘The Collective Securitization of Terrorism in the European
Union’. West European Politics, 42 (2), 261- 277.
Kinnvall, C., Manners, I., & Mitzen, J. (2018).
‘Introduction to 2018 Special Issue of European Security: “Ontological
(In)Security in the European Union”’. European Security, 27 (3), 249-265.
Lamour, C. (2018).
‘Mass Media and Border Securitization in Europe: Investigating
the Metropolitan “Mediapolis” in an Era of RightWing Populism’. Journal of
Urban Affairs . Levinger, M. (2018).
‘Master Narratives of Disinformation Campaigns’. Journal of
International Affairs, 71 (1.5), 125-134.
Manners, I., & Diez, T. (2006). ‘Reflecting on Normative
Power Europe’. In F. Berenskoetter, & M. J. Williams, Power in World
Politics (pp. 173-188). New York: Routledge.
Meleagrou-Hitchens, A. (2017). ‘The Challenges and
Limitations of Online Counter-Narratives in the Fight Against ISIS Recruitment
in Europe and North America’. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 18
(3), 95-104. Morgan, S. (2018).
‘Fake News, Disinformation, Manipulation and Online Tactics
to Undermine Democracy’. Journal of Cyber Policy, 3 (1), 39-43.
(November/December 2010). ‘Manufacturing Insecurity: How Militarism Endangers
America’. Foreign Affairs.
(2016). ‘Europe’s New Identity: The Refugee Crisis and the Rise of
Nationalism’. Europe’s Journal of Psychology, 12 (2).
Schmid, A. (2005).
‘Terrorism as Psychological Warfare’. Democracy and Security (1), 137-146.
Schuman, R. (1950, May 09). The Schuman Declaration. Paris.
Spaulding, S., Nair, D., & Nelson, A. (2018). ‘Why Putin
Targets Minorities’. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International
Studies. Stebbins, H. (2018, April 17). ‘Narrative and Information: Russian
Cyber Operations’. International Review
Szalai, A. (2017). ‘Securitization as Enacted Melodrama: The
Political Spectacle of the Hungarian AntiImmigration Campaign’. ECPR General
Conference 2017, Univesity of Oslo. Oslo: ECPR.
Thomas, T. (2016). ‘Russia’s 21st Century Information War:
Working to Undermine and Destabilize Populations’. Defense Strategic
Communication (1), 10-25.
Tuck, H., & Silverman, T. (2016). ‘The Counter-Narrative
Handbook’. London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue
Weldes, J., Laffey, M., & Gusterson, H. (1999).
‘Introduction: Constructing Insecurity’ In J. Weldes, M. Laffey, H. Gusterson,
& R. Duvall, Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the
Production of Danger (pp. 1-35). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.